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NAVIGATING PUBLIC ACCESS AND OWNER CONTROL
ON THE ROUGH WATERS OF POPULAR MUSIC
COPYRIGHT LAW
You an' me, we sweat an' strain,
Body all achin' an' racked with pain ....
Ah gits weary an' sick of tryin'
Ah'm tired of livin' an' skeered of dyin',
But 01' man river he jus' keeps rollin' along.
The compulsory licensing provision of the Copyright Act of 19762
("the Act") elicits these thoughts and feelings among many scholars, au-
1. "O1' Man River," words by Oscar Hammerstein II and music by Jerome Kern, 1927.
The copyrights in this song, specifically the right to import into the United States pho-
norecords manufactured in a foreign country, were the subject of T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem
Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987).
2. The compulsory licensing provision states in relevant part:
In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive rights provided by
clauses (1) and (3) of section 106, to make and to distribute phonorecords of such
works, are subject to compulsory licensing under the conditions specified by this sec-
tion.
(a) Availability and Scope of Compulsory License.
(1) When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed
to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owner, any
other person may, by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a compul-
sory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work. A person may obtain
a compulsory license only if his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to
distribute them to the public for private use. A person may not obtain a compulsory
license for use of the work in the making of phonorecords duplicating a sound re-
cording fixed by another, unless: (i) such sound recording was fixed lawfully; and
(ii) the making of the phonorecords was authorized by the owner of copyright in the
sound recording or, if the sound recording was fixed before February 15, 1972, by
any person who fixed the sound recording pursuant to an express license from the
owner of the copyright in the musical work or pursuant to a valid compulsory license
for the use of such work in a sound recording.
(2) A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrange-
ment of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of
interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the
basic melody or fundamental character of the work, and shall not be subject to pro-
tection as a derivative work under this title, except with the express consent of the
copyright owner.
(b) Notice of Intention to Obtain Compulsory License.
(1) Any person who wishes to obtain a compulsory license under this section
shall, before or within thirty days after making, and before distributing any pho-
norecords of the work, serve notice of intention to do so on the copyright owner ....
(2) Failure to serve or file notice required by clause (1) forecloses the possibil-
ity of a compulsory license and, in the absence of a negotiated license, renders the
making and distribution of phonorecords actionable as acts of infringement under
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thors, composers and members of the copyright bar.' Despite the many
complaints against compulsory licensing since it was first enacted in the
Copyright Act of 1909, compulsory licensing keeps rolling along, some-
times taking the parties involved to bizarre destinations. Compulsory li-
censing promotes a policy which is inconsistent with the basic principle
of copyright law.4 Copyright law is primarily designed to encourage cre-
ative work by artists and inventors by granting them a limited monopoly
in the use of and profit from their work.5 Copyright owners are granted
control throughout the Act: in the exclusive rights provided in section
106,6 and in the prohibition against unauthorized importation of copies
or phonorecords provided for in section 602.' But compulsory licensing
section 501 and fully subject to the remedies provided by section 502 through 506
and 509.
(c) Royalty Payable under Compulsory License.
(2) ... With respect to each work embodied in the phonorecord, the royalty
shall be either two and three-fourths cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of
playing time or fraction thereof, whichever amount is larger.
17 U.S.C. §.115 (1986).
Once all the conditions are met, the compulsory licensee obtains the right to use musi-
cians, singers and technicians to produce a sound recording of the musical composition. 2
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.04[E] (1987).
3. Bach, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses: Toward a Consistent
Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 390 (1986) (discusses the disparate treatment of
recorded music and published sheet music). Rosenlund, Compulsory Licensing of Musical
Compositions for Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 693
(1979) (discusses the disparate treatment of composers and recording companies).
4. Bach, supra note 3, at 385.
Once the musical composition has been released to the public, the provision allows any-
one to use and profit from a popular song merely by filing a notice of use and paying a statu-
tory royalty fee. The provision prevents the copyright owner from negotiating fees for the use
of the composition, withholding the composition from further publication or monitoring who
mechanically reproduces (records) the composition. The copyright owner may retain exclu-
sive control of the composition by not releasing it to the public, but such a retention of control
also prevents the copyright owner from profiting from his composition at all.
The provision is entitled "compulsory" because the copyright owner is forced or com-
pelled by the statute to allow others to make sound recordings of his composition. 2 NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 8.04[A]; Bach, supra note 3, at 380. The copyright owner does not actually
"grant" a compulsory license; the licensee obtains the license by complying with the statutory
requirements.
5. Bach, supra note 3, at 381.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986). Section 106 lists the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Limi-
tations on the exclusive rights are found in §§ 107-118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-118 (1986).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 602 provides in relevant part:
(a) Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of
copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been ac-
quired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute
copies of phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501. This subsec-
tion does not apply to-
(1) importation of copies or phonorecords under the authority or for the use of
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limits the copyright owner's control over his composition, and thereby
discourages creative work.' The limitations compulsory licensing im-
poses upon copyright owner control are justified by the policy of increas-
ing public access to musical compositions, which is also an important
principle of copyright law.9
The decision in TB. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc. 1o ("Harms")
exemplifies how the two competing policies of copyright law embodied
in sections 115 and 602-the guarantee of public access and the right to
control importation' '-crash against each other and muddy the waters
of copyright law. The provision against unauthorized importation is
consistent with the owner control policy of copyright law, but it conflicts
with the public access policy of the compulsory licensing provision. The
Harms decision is unsettling because the court cannot serve both policies;
the Government of the United States or of any State or political subdivision of a
State, but not including copies or phonorecords for use in schools, or copies of any
audiovisual work imported for purposes other than archival use;
(2) importation, for the private use of the importer and not for distribution, by
any person with respect to no more than one copy or phonorecord of any one work at
any one time, or by any person arriving from outside the United States with respect
to copies or phonorecords forming part of such person's personal baggage; or
(3) importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or
religious purposes and not for private gain, with respect to no more than one copy of
an audiovisual work solely for its archival purposes, and no more than five copies or
phonorecords of any other work for its library lending or archival purposes, unless
the importation of such copies or phonorecords is part of an activity consisting of
systematic reproduction or distribution, engaged in by such organization in violation
of the provisions of section 108(g)( 2 ).
(b) In a case where the making of the copies or phonorecords would have consti-
tuted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation
is prohibited. In a case where the copies or phonorecords were lawfully made, the
United States Customs Service has no authority to prevent their importation unless
the provisions of section 601 are applicable. In either case, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to prescribe by regulation, a procedure under which any per-
son claiming an interest in the copyright in a particular work may, upon payment of
a specified fee, be entitled to notification by the Customs Service of the importation of
articles that appear to be copies or phonorecords of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
Section 602 provides that unauthorized importation of copies or phonorecords legally and
illegally manufactured outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right of the
copyright owner to control distribution of the work. The right applies to all copies or pho-
norecords, but only the distributor of the unauthorized copies is liable for infringement. 2
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11.
The distribution right allows the copyright owner to authorize or "to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1986).
8. See supra note 6, and infra note 30. The title of section 115 states that it is a limitation
on the copyright owner's exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1986).
9. See infra note 37 for the history of the compulsory licensing provision.
10. 655 F. Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 602 (1986).
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any decision results in giving more weight to one of the conflicting poli-
cies at the expense of the other. Thus, the compulsory licensing provi-
sion puts the court in the difficult position of navigating between public
access and owner control on the rough waters of copyright law.
THE HARMS FACTS: ARE PHONORECORDS LAWFULLY
MANUFACTURED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
COPYRIGHT INFRINGERS UPON IMPORTATION?
In Harms, phonorecords lawfully manufactured under the applica-
ble compulsory licensing provision in New Zealand copyright law were
held to be copyright infringing materials when imported into the United
States. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
held that the exclusive right of the copyright owner to prohibit unauthor-
ized importation is not extinguished by the compulsory licensing provi-
sion, and that unauthorized importers are copyright infringers, even
when the phonorecords they import are lawfully manufactured in New
Zealand. 12
Plaintiff T.B. Harms Co. ("Harms") was a California corporation in
the business of licensing and marketing copyrighted musical composi-
tions. Harms owned a valid copyright in the musical composition "Ol'
Man River," written by Oscar Hammerstein II and Jerome Kern.' 3 De-
fendant Jem Records, Inc. ("Jem") was a New Jersey corporation which
manufactured, imported and distributed phonorecords. 4 A Frank Sina-
tra performance of "Ol' Man River" was made into a sound recording
embodied on the phonorecord, "His Greatest Hits, Frank Sinatra-New
York, New York."15 Under the compulsory licensing provisions of the
New Zealand Copyright Act, copies of the phonorecord were lawfully
manufactured and distributed in New Zealand by WEA Records, Ltd.,
12. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1583.
13. Composers often assign their copyrights to music publishing companies, such as
Harms, which market musical compositions, issue licenses and collect royalties on behalf of
the composer. Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 684.
14. Phonorecords are objects in which sounds are fixed and from which sounds can be
perceived or reproduced, such as disks, tapes, etc. Sound recordings are works that result
from the fixation of sounds. A musical composition differs from a sound recording; the com-
position is the song itself. Both musical compositions and sound recordings may be copy-
righted, although the copyrights are separate and distinct. The copyrights in the musical
composition and in the sound recording may be owned by different parties, and are treated
differently under the statutes. Only musical compositions are subject to compulsory licensing.
Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1576, n.l.
A copyright in a sound recording does not give the owner any rights or interest in the
underlying musical composition. 2 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.04[B].
15. In addition to "O1' Man River," the phonorecord contained fifteen other musical com-
positions performed by Sinatra.
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an affiliate of WEA International, Inc., Chappel and Intersong Music
Group (Australia) Ltd. ("WEA"). WEA owned the right to authorize
the manufacture and distribution in New Zealand of Harms' musical
compositions and received royalties from phonorecords containing "01'
Man River."' 6
Jem imported copies of the Sinatra phonorecord manufactured by
WEA into the United States. WEA consented to Jem's importation, dis-
tribution and sale of the phonorecords within the United States. WEA
acted under the authority and with the permission of the owners of the
sound recordings embodied on the phonorecord. Jem did not obtain the
permission of Harms or any other owners of the copyrights in the musi-
cal compositions on the Sinatra album.'" Harms had issued both com-
pulsory and negotiated licenses' 8  permitting the manufacture,
distribution and sale of phonorecords embodying "01' Man River" in the
United States. Harms also granted many licenses and other authoriza-
tions outside the United States, which permitted the manufacture and
distribution of phonorecords embodying performances of "01' Man
River." Many of the licenses were obtained under the compulsory licens-
ing provisions of the respective foreign countries. 9
Harms brought a copyright infringement action against Jem for an
alleged violation of section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which
makes unauthorized importation of copyrighted goods into the United
States an infringement of copyright. 20 The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the issue of liability, and stipulated the facts
before the court.2 '
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS: COMPULSORY LICENSING DOES NOT LIMIT
THE RIGHT TO PROHIBIT UNAUTHORIZED IMPORTATION
The court relied on the actual language of section 602 of the Act and
its legislative history to reach its holding that the act of importation itself
constitutes copyright infringement. 22 According to a House of Repre-
16. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1577.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 2 for the text of the compulsory licensing provision. 17 U.S.C. § 115
(1986). A negotiated license is an agreement between the individual parties for the use of the
copyrighted work; the Act makes no provisions for negotiated licenses.
19. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1577.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1986). See supra note 7 for the text of section 602.
21. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1577.
22. See supra note 7 for the text of section 602. The court found that the exceptions within
the section did not apply to Jem. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1578.
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sentatives Report discussing the Act,2 3 section 602 applies to both the
importation of "piratical" articles 24 and to the unauthorized importation
of copies or phonorecords which are lawfully made. The court's discus-
sion focused on the prohibition against unauthorized importation of cop-
ies or phonorecords legally manufactured outside the United States.25
Jem argued that section 602 does not apply to the phonorecords it
imported from New Zealand into the United States because the section
only applies to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Jem argued
that Harms did not have exclusive rights to "01' Man River" because
under the compulsory licensing provision, once a compulsory license has
been granted, the rights of the copyright owner are no longer "exclu-
sive. Through compulsory licensing, once a copyrighted musical com-
position has been recorded and released to the public, anyone may obtain
the right to make a sound recording of the musical composition merely
by serving the owner with notice and paying the statutory royalty.27
The court did not accept Jem's argument regarding the limits on the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner. The court stated that it must
assume that an ordinary construction of the language used by Congress
adequately expresses the legislative intent. 2' The court stated: "Congress
employed the term 'exclusive rights' to define the rights of a copyright
owner under the Act."' 29 Based on that statement, the court determined
that the plain language of the statute does not indicate that the exclusive
rights of a copyright holder are extinguished once a compulsory license is
obtained.3"
23. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1578 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 169
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5785 [hereinafter House
Report]).
24. Pirated articles are copies or phonorecords made without the permission of the copy-
right owner. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1578. In the record industry these copies are also known
as bootlegs. These tapes, albums, disks, etc., usually embody copies of sound recordings made
without the authorization of the sound recording copyright owner. Because these pho-
norecords are made without copyright owner authorization, they are considered to be illegally
manufactured. Section 602(b) prohibits the importation of pirated or bootleg copies. 17
U.S.C. § 602(b) (1986).
Jem was not considered a bootlegger or a record pirate because it obtained permission
from the owners of the sound recordings embodied on the Frank Sinatra phonorecord to
reproduce, export and sell the phonorecords. The court held that Jem did violate Harms'
exclusive distribution right by its unauthorized importation and found Jem to be a copyright
infringer under section 602(a). Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1583; 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1986).
25. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1578.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1578-79.
28. Id. at 1580.
29. Id.
30. The court did admit that the exclusive rights of the copyright holder are limited by
[Vol. 8
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The court also rejected Jem's next argument, which relied on a dis-
cussion of music industry representatives with the General Counsel of
the United States Copyright Office. 3 The court found that source unper-
suasive because the House Judiciary Committee disavowed its support of
the statements when it published the transcripts of the discussions.32 The
court stated that "the statements made by private citizens at a committee
hearing who represent private interest groups which have a financial in-
terest in how a statute will be interpreted, is entitled to little, if any,
weight in interpreting Congressional intent."33 The court stated that it
had no evidence to base a finding that Congress had any intent to nullify
the right to control unauthorized importation when section 602 is ap-
plied to musical compositions licensed under section 115."4
Jem finally presented cases which supported its theory that the ex-
clusive rights of a copyright owner are extinguished once the musical
composition is available for compulsory licensing.35 The court based its
interpretation of the purpose of the compulsory licensing provision on
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc. 36 ("Jondora").
According to Jondora, the provision was inserted into the Copyright Act
of 1909 to prevent monopolies by music manufacturers and to guarantee
the public access to popular songs, not to defeat the control of the com-
posers and copyright owners in their creations.37 The Jondora court
compulsory licensing, although they are not extinguished. The owner of a compulsory license
purchases only the right to mechanically reproduce (or record) the musical composition. The
compulsory license is a limitation on the exclusive distribution right of the copyright owner
because it allows others to manufacture and distribute phonorecords which embody the copy-
righted musical composition. Id. at 1581.
31. Id. (citing Copyright Office, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part 4,
Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law
III).
32. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1581.
33. Id.
34. Id. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 602 (1986).
35. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1581. Jem relied on Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody
Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972), subsequent op., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J.
1973), vacated, 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) and American
Metro. Enter., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1968) to support its
arguments.
36. Jondora, 351 F. Supp. 572.
37. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1581-82. The compulsory licensing provision was first enacted
as section 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909. The provision was enacted to give composers
some control over the mechanical or sound reproduction of their compositions and guarantee
public access to popular music. Prior to the 1909 Act, manufacturers of piano rolls and pho-
nograph cylinders could reproduce musical compositions without paying composers a royalty.
Despite the desire to compensate composers by granting them exclusive control of the mechan-
ical reproduction of their works, congressional action was tempered by congressional fear of a
giant music monopoly. At the time, a single piano roll manufacturing company owned the
1988]
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held, and the Harms court agreed, that the compulsory licensing provi-
sion should be interpreted in a way which does not punish the copyright
holder."8
The Harms court distinguished the precedents offered by Jem as
cases involving manufacturers and distributors, while Jem was only a
middleman distributor, and was not involved in manufacturing. The
court stated that the compulsory licensing provision only applies to those
who "make and distribute phonorecords of the [copyrighted] work."3 9
In other words, one who acts only as a middleman distributor of pho-
norecords embodying copyrighted musical compositions, as Jem did, is
not protected by the compulsory licensing provision.' The court relied
on United States v. Gallant4 to support its point that the right to dis-
tribute phonorecords embodying copyrighted musical compositions
under section 115 is limited to phonorecords manufactured under the
provision.42 Because Jem, like Gallant, did not manufacture the sound
recordings embodied on the phonorecords it distributed, the compulsory
licensing provision does not apply.43
reproduction rights of many popular songs. The provision attempted to balance these interests
by giving composers a statutory royalty for the mechanical reproduction of their compositions
and allowing anyone to reproduce a musical composition after its first public release. Rosen-
lund, supra note 3, at 686-87.
38. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582.
39. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1986) (emphasis added)).
40. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work in "copies or pho-
norecords" under section 106(1). 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1986). The compulsory licensee has the
right only to "make and distribute phonorecords of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1986).
The compulsory license does not grant the right to perform or to reproduce the work in sheet
music or other copies. The license does grant a right to distribute phonorecords made under
the license. In other words, under the compulsory licensing provision, manufacturing and
distributing must go hand in hand. 2 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.04[B].
41. 570 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, Dowling v. United States,
473 U.S. 207 (1985).
42. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582. The court characterizes Gallant as a middleman distrib-
utor of phonorecords. Actually, he faced criminal prosecution for bootlegging or tape piracy,
a copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). See supra note 24 and infra note 43.
43. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582.
A bootlegger or pirate is still a copyright infringer even if he manufactures and distributes
the phonorecords he produces. See supra note 24. The court made the distinction between
making sound recordings and making phonorecords to protect sound recording copyright
owners. The 1909 Act, unlike the current Act, did not withhold the application of the compul-
sory license to a musical composition because the composition had been duplicated from a
sound recording fixed by another. The limitation was implied into the 1909 Act by the Duch-
ess doctrine, which is found in Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied sub noma. Rosner v. Duchess Music Corp., 409 U.S. 847 (1972) ("Duchess"). The
Duchess doctrine states that a compulsory license in a musical composition is not available to
one who duplicated the work from a sound recording without the permission of the sound
recording copyright owner. Duchess, 458 F.2d at 1311. The Duchess court stated that making
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The court further stated that even if the compulsory licensing provi-
sion could be applied to a middleman distributor like Jem, Jem failed to
comply with the requirements of section 115. Jem neither served Harms
with a notice of use for "01' Man River" nor did it pay the statutory
royalty as section 115 requires." The court compared the facts in Harms
to the facts in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Dis-
tributors, Inc.45 ("Scorpio"). Scorpio purchased phonorecords which
were legally manufactured in the Philippines but imported into the
United States without the authorization of copyright owner Columbia.46
Columbia brought suit against Scorpio for copyright infringement under
section 602 of the Act.4 7 Scorpio argued that the right of the copyright
owner to control importation in section 602 is inconsistent with the first
sale doctrine in section 109 of the Act,48 and that the section 602 right is
limited by section 109. Scorpio argued that the phonorecords were the
subject of a valid first sale and therefore Columbia no longer had the
exclusive right to control distribution under section 602 of the Act.4 9
The Scorpio court found that the first sale doctrine only protects
buyers of phonorecords which are "legally manufactured and sold" in
an identical duplication of a sound recording copyrighted by another does not constitute a
similar use under the compulsory licensing provision. Id. at 1310. The Duchess doctrine is
codified to some extent in section 115(a)(i). 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1986).
For examples of the application of the Duchess doctrine, see, e.g., Fame Publishing Co.,
Inc. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841
(1975); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972), subsequent op., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated, 506
F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975). See also 2 NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 8.04[E]; Marks, 497 F.2d at 291 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting); Jondora, 506 F.2d at 397 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting); Fame, 507 F.2d at 672 (Godbold, J., dissenting); Duchess, 458 F.2d at
1311 (Byrne, C.J., dissenting) (for criticisms of the Duchess doctrine).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(c) (1986). Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582.
45. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582 (citing Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd
without op., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984)).
46. Plaintiff Columbia authorized a Philippine corporation to manufacture and sell pho-
norecords in the Philippines embodying six sound recordings to which it owned the copyrights
in the United States. The phonorecords were sold four times and finally were purchased by
defendant Scorpio. Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 47.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986). See supra note 7.
48. Section 109(a) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of
a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1986). Section 109, like section 115, is a limitation on the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner. The section 109 provision is known as the "first sale
doctrine." "Under the first sale doctrine, when a copyrighted work is the subject of a valid
first sale, the distribution rights of the copyright holder are extinguished and title passes to the
buyer." Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582.
49. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582.
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the United States5 ° and that the protection does not extend to purchasers
of imported phonorecords who intend to resell them in the United States.
The court found Scorpio to be a copyright infringer under section 602 of
the Act.5'
The Harms court focused on the second rationale offered by the
Scorpio court for its decision, that "to construe [section] 109(a) as nullify-
ing a copyright owner's ability to invoke the protections against unau-
thorized importation would render section 602 meaningless."52 The
court drew a parallel between sections 115 and 109 and determined that
allowing the limitations in sections 107 through 118" to extinguish the
right granted by section 602 would contravene the congressional purpose
of enacting section 602."4 Based on the Scorpio decision, the Harms
court rejected Jem's argument that the compulsory licensing provision
acts as a limitation on the right of the copyright owner to control unau-
thorized importation. The court indicated that the only difference be-
tween Jem's arguments in Harms and Scorpio's arguments was that each
relied on a different section of the Act, and therefore on a different limi-
tation on the copyright owner's exclusive distribution right. The Harms
court stated that "to allow the defendant to rely on a limitation of the
owner's exclusive rights to circumvent the prohibition on importation
would tie the hands of the copyright holder who seeks to exercise his
rights to control copies of the work which enter the American market. '1 5
50. Id. at 1583 (citing Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49).
"Manufacture and sale" under section 109 appears to be analogous to "manufacture and
distribution" under section 115. In other words, the manufacture and sale under section 109
must take place in the country for which the license or copyright is granted. The first sale
must be of a particular phonorecord to an individual purchaser, not to a middleman distribu-
tor who may later export the phonorecords. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contact
(PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Sebastian").
Sebastian involved the unauthorized importation of hair care products. The defendant,
like Scorpio, argued that the first sale doctrine made section 602 inapplicable. The Sebastian
court understood Scorpio for the proposition that: "[T]he phrase 'lawfully made under this
title' has been interpreted to mean 'lawfully made in the United States,' thereby limiting the
first sale doctrine to cases involving domestically manufactured works .... Scorpio ... stand[s]
for the proposition that the first sale doctrine does not apply to foreign first sales because the
United States code does not apply extraterritorially." Sebastian, 664 F. Supp. at 914. The
court then criticized the Scorpio court's interpretation of this language and provided its own
interpretation based on the House Report, supra note 23. Sebastian, 664 F. Supp. at 916.
51. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1583.
52. Id.
53. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1986).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
55. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1583.
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The court found that Jem was a copyright infringer under section 602 of
the Act.56
NAVIGATING ROUGH WATERS: THE PROBLEMS
WITH COMPULSORY LICENSING
The Harms decision is consistent with the basic principle of copy-
right law.5 7 In accordance with the power granted to it in the Constitu-
tion,58 Congress developed copyright law to provide artists, composers,
writers and inventors with a monopoly in their work for a limited time.
The monopoly allows the copyright owner to control and profit from his
work and thereby encourages the owner's creative efforts. 59 The Harms
decision is firmly based on the principle that the copyright owner should
have control over his or her work and the market for that work. "This
court cannot construe the statute so as to alter the intent of Congress,
which has set restrictions on the importation of phonorecords in order
that rights of United States copyright owners can be preserved. "60 The
policy of copyright owner control, as embodied in section 602 of the
Act,6' dominated the Harms opinion. The Harms court shifted the bal-
ance in its decision toward the owner control policy and away from the
public access policy. The decision is unsettling because the court en-
forces the dominant owner control policy while compromising the public
access policy embodied in the compulsory licensing provision. If the pol-
icy of public access to popular songs is important enough to limit the
copyright owner's exclusive rights and to be codified in section 115, why
did the Harms court neglect it? Public access is the basis of the profits
and survival of the recording industry, and judicial and statutory es-
pousal of the policy is no longer necessary to perpetuate it. The problem
in the Harms decision lies not in the application of the law to the case,
but in the law itself; it lies in the compulsory licensing provision.62
This casenote suggests that the original purpose of the compulsory
56. Id.
57. See supra note 5 and accompanying text, and infra note 59.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 grants Congress the power "[tio promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
59. "[G]ranting a limited monopoly in copyright advances the public interest because it
encourages artists to create through the prospect of financial gain." Bach, supra note 3, at 383.
60. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1583 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio
Music Distributors, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without op., 738 F.2d
424 (3d Cir. 1984)(emphasis added)).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
62. See supra note 2 for the text of the compulsory licensing provision, 17 U.S.C. § 115
(1986). See supra note 3 for articles which criticize compulsory licensing.
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licensing provision, to prevent a music monopoly, is extinct and that
public access to popular music is virtually guaranteed in the recording
industry today.6 3 Although some type of licensing provision is necessary
to facilitate the use of popular musical compositions, the policy to com-
pensate copyright owners for the use of their work and encourage them
to create is not served by the royalty limitations imposed by the current
provision.' Compulsory licensing acts as an unnecessary limit on the
opportunities available to musical composition copyright owners and
fans of popular music to enjoy the benefits of a free market.65 The provi-
sion is also inconsistent with the copyright policy of owner control of the
market in the form of a limited monopoly. The current provision also
fosters disparate treatment between owners of musical composition copy-
rights and owners of other copyrights, which is not necessary to promote
the public access policy.66 The provision also fosters litigation due to the
confusion it perpetuates in the law and its inconsistent treatment of dif-
ferent copyright owners.
Although the Harms court found that the compulsory licensing pro-
vision should be interpreted so that it does not punish the musical com-
position copyright owner, the provision punishes the copyright owner by
its own terms without judicial assistance.67 Rather than attempting to
minimize the severity of compulsory licensing on the musical composi-
tion copyright owner and producing anomalous decisions as the Harms
court did, the compulsory licensing provision itself should be altered.
Since industry practice guarantees public access to popular music and the
provision is inconsistent with the owner control policy of copyright law,
the outdated compulsory licensing provision should be modified to elimi-
nate the inconsistencies it fosters in the law, and the free market should
be allowed to operate.
The recording industry itself espouses conflicting opinions about the
merits of the compulsory licensing provision. Musical composition copy-
right owners desire to limit the scope of the provision, while music manu-
facturers and distributors desire to expand its scope. Composers, authors
63. Access to musical compositions is the basis of the profits of the recording and radio
industries as we know them. See infra note 71. The industry is so dependent on the public
access to musical compositions that the compulsory licensing provision provides that if the
provision is abolished it is likely that it would be replaced by a system which also guarantees
public access. Bach, supra note 3, at 395-96.
64. See supra note 4, and text accompanying note 68.
65. Bach, supra note 3, at 396-401; Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 702-03.
66. See supra note 14 and infra note 75. See also Bach and Rosenlund, supra note 3, for
the disparate treatment of musical composition copyright owners.
67. See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text.
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and publishers dislike the provision because it destroys their control of
who records the musical composition.68 The provision also acts as a ceil-
ing on the royalty rates paid for the use of the composition. Even if the
copyright owner has an opportunity to negotiate a royalty for the use of
the composition, the negotiated royalty is rarely higher than the rate pro-
scribed by section 115.69
Copyright owners should have some control over who records their
compositions. It is unlikely that many owners would completely with-
hold their compositions from mechanical reproduction after the first re-
lease because this would prevent them from obtaining all the profits
possible from the composition. It is in the best interest of the copyright
owner to allow his composition to be recorded. Consequently, it is un-
likely that a music monopoly would result from giving musical composi-
tion copyright owners additional control of and compensation for their
work. Since musical composition copyright owners are given control of
the importation of their work, it seems reasonable that they should be
given control over the mechanical reproduction of their work and their
royalties as well.
On the other hand, record companies love the compulsory licensing
provision. Although it began as an attempt to prevent the development
of monopolies in music manufacturing,7" the provision forms the basis
for the record industry as we know it today.7' It provides record compa-
nies with access to popular songs at a minimal cost and without the
trouble of negotiating royalty rates and conditions with individual copy-
right owners.72 The conflicting interests within the industry put up a
great fight during the last copyright revision,73 but the collective power
of the record companies outweighed that of the composers, authors and
musical composition copyright owners, and the compulsory licensing
68. See supra note 4.
69. Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 684, 689, 702.
70. See supra note 37 for the history and original purposes of the compulsory licensing
provision.
71. The original compulsory licensing provision did not give the composers the control
over the mechanical reproduction of their compositions that they desired. The composers
settled for the statutory royalty rather than continue to not be compensated at all for the use of
their work. During discussions about the copyright code revision in 1965, the record compa-
nies indicated that the record industry as we know it was so dependent on compulsory licens-
ing that the provision could not be eliminated. Despite the recognition that the music
monopoly feared by Congress in 1906 was no longer a threat to the public access to popular
music and that compulsory licensing no longer served any public purpose, the provision sur-
vived the 1976 copyright revision. Bach, supra note 3, at 392-93, and Rosenlund, supra note 3,
at 693.
72. Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 689-90.
73. Bach, supra note 3, at 390-93.
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provision remained in the Act.74
An additional problem with the compulsory licensing provision is
that it only applies to nondramatic musical works, or popular songs."
Popular musical compositions are treated differently than other copy-
righted works, which accounts for some of the strained statutory read-
ings and anomalous case results.76 In fact, musical compositions are
treated differently than the sound recordings which embody them. 7
Often, precedents involving goods not subject to the compulsory licens-
ing provision are used to support decisions involving nondramatic musi-
cal works and vice versa.78
For example, the infringing phonorecords in Scorpio embodied
sound recordings rather than musical compositions which were owned
by Columbia. Scorpio did not argue that the records it imported from
the Philippines were protected by the compulsory licensing provision be-
cause it had not complied with the requirements of the provision and
sound recordings are not subject to compulsory licensing.79 Scorpio, like
Jem, argued that the compulsory licensing provision limits the musical
composition copyright owner's control of the market, and therefore the
owner should not be allowed to control the market under section 602.80
The Harms court stated that for its purposes it was irrelevant that Scor-
pio involved sound recordings and Harms involved musical
compositions.81
But, because of the disparate treatment of musical compositions and
sound recordings under the Act, the distinction between the two copy-
rights does make a difference. The argument both defendants made
74. See supra note 71.
75. The compulsory licensing provision does not apply to literary or dramatic works or to
sound recordings. The works of painters, sculptors, choreographers, photographers, etc., are
not subject to compulsory licensing. The provision only applies to nondramatic musical
works, which are usually popular songs. 2 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.04[A].
76. See supra note 43 for the Duchess doctrine, which is one of the most bizarre out-
growths of the compulsory licensing provision. 2 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.04[E].
77. Only nondramatic musical works (popular songs) are subject to compulsory licensing.
See supra note 2 for the text of the provision. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1986). Sound recordings of
musical compositions are not subject to compulsory licensing. See supra notes 14 and 75.
78. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 914, 915
(D.N.J. 1987); supra note 50. This case involved the unauthorized importation of hair care
products which are not subject to compulsory licensing. The court discussed Scorpio, Harms
and several cases which did not involve goods subject to compulsory licensing. The Sebastian
court criticized the Scorpio decision but its reasoning and application of Scorpio and Harms is
not discussed here because it never mentioned compulsory licensing.
79. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc., 569 F. Supp.
47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without op., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
81. T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1583 (D.N.J. 1987).
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should have been more effective for Jem than it was for Scorpio. Sound
recordings, like other copyrighted goods not subject to compulsory li-
censing, are unique and merit the protection of section 602.82 Since
sound recordings are not subject to compulsory licensing, the owner of
the sound recording does have a limited monopoly in its copyright, and
should be able to protect that monopoly by invoking the prohibition
against unauthorized importation. 3 Unauthorized importation of le-
gally 4 or illegally 5 manufactured copyrighted sound recordings which
are already available in the United States could have a severe impact on
the sound recording copyright owner's profits.8 6 On the other hand, as
Jem argued, owners of musical composition copyrights have no control
over the market once they release their composition to the public. 7
Since owners like Harms are paid royalties for the use of their copyright
for all renditions of the musical composition under compulsory licenses 8
and they have no control over the market, they should not be able to
invoke the rights provided by section 602.89
Because the Harms court relied so extensively on the Scorpio deci-
sion, it was unable to see the distinction in the similar arguments offered
by the two defendants.9° Jem's argument failed for a number of reasons.
As discussed above, the court misplaced its reliance on the Scorpio deci-
sion. Jem's argument also failed because the court probably miscon-
strued it. The court found that Jem could not invoke the protection of
82. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
83. Id.
84. Legally manufactured sound recordings are those recordings which are authorized by
the copyright owner to be manufactured and distributed in a foreign country.
85. Illegally manufactured sound recordings are those recordings which are not author-
ized for manufacture and distribution by the copyright owner, such as bootleg copies. See
supra note 24.
86. Courts construed the language of the 1909 Act under the Duchess doctrine to limit the
compulsory licensing provision and give sound recording copyright owners control of their
market. See supra note 43. Since the 1909 Act, trade and transportation has increased and
diminished the copyright owner's control of the United States' market. Congress enacted sec-
tion 602 in the new Act to reassert the copyright owner's control of the United States' market.
The section includes the dual prohibition against legally and illegally manufactured goods to
allow United States copyright owners to license their goods for manufacture and distribution
in another country and still control the United States' market. See Selchow & Righter v.
Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
87. See supra note 4.
88. In fact, the musical composition copyright owner's profits may be enhanced by impor-
tation. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
90. Had Harms owned copyrights in the sound recordings, rather than in the musical
composition, the reliance of the Harms court on Scorpio would have been justified. The Harms
court's reliance on Scorpio was not justified because owners of sound recording and musical
composition copyrights are treated differently under the Act. See supra note 14.
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the compulsory licensing provision because it did not comply with the
requirements of the provision. Jem did not argue that it was a licensee
under the provision. Jem argued that the compulsory licensing provision
erodes the copyright owner's control of the copies available in the United
States market, and therefore the owner should not be able to gain control
over the market through section 602."
Another reason why Jem's argument failed was that the unauthor-
ized importation of copyrighted goods was expressly contemplated by
Congress and clearly stated in the plain language of section 602.92 The
prohibition makes sense when applied to the owners of sound recordings
and other copyrighted goods not subject to compulsory licensing93 be-
cause of their ability to control the market. Since so many versions of
musical compositions are available under compulsory licensing, it is
anomalous that Congress gave copyright owners the right to prevent the
importation of more versions. In fact, the Harms court found no evi-
dence that Congress intended to make the rights granted by section 602
inapplicable to musical compositions licensed under section 115.94 The
Harms court did not find any evidence because Congress apparently did
not contemplate the result of applying the prohibition against unauthor-
ized importation to musical compositions subject to compulsory
licensing.95
91. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986). Even if Jem had paid the statutory royalty and filed a notice
of use, it still would have been a copyright infringer because of the manufacturing and distrib-
uting clause in section 115(a)(l). 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1986). The Harms court found "that Jem
was only a distributor of the Sinatra phonorecord," and therefore the compulsory licensing
provision was inapplicable. T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1582
(D.N.J. 1987). See supra notes 40 and 43. See also United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
92. See supra note 7 for the text of 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1986).
The dual prohibition against unauthorized importation of copyrighted goods legally and
illegally manufactured outside the United States indicates that Congress specifically contem-
plated giving the copyright owner additional control of the United States market. See supra
note 86.
93. See generally, Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla.
1985)(enforcing section 602 against unauthorized importation of legally manufactured copy-
righted goods); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich.
1982), distinguished, Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.
1985)(enforcing section 602 against unauthorized importation of illegally manufactured copy-
righted goods).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
95. Jem could not argue that it had permission from Harms through a chain of authority
rationale (from Harms, to WEA, to compulsory licensees under New Zealand copyright law
who owned rights in the sound recordings, to Jem) for two reasons. First, the compulsory
license only grants the right to manufacture and distribute and grants no rights in the underly-
ing musical composition to the producer of the sound recording. See supra note 14. There-
fore, the compulsory licensees under WEA had no rights in the musical composition "o' Man
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WHY HARMS SUED: THE STRUGGLE FOR OWNER CONTROL
Because Harms had already received royalties for the records from
WEA, Harms was not suing for compensation for the use of its composi-
tion. It is possible that Harms found a loophole in the law and a way to
obtain double compensation for a single license of its composition, but
this is an unlikely rationale.96 Actually, Harms sued to enforce its legiti-
mate right under section 602"7 and for control of its composition and its
market. Harms sued to exert any control that it could to minimize the
impact of the compulsory licensing provision.98
Because Harms was the owner of the copyright in the musical com-
position "O1' Man River" and not in the sound recording, 99 Harms will
receive royalty payments under the compulsory licensing provision as
long as the phonorecords are distributed."° If Harms owned the sound
recording, an unauthorized importation of legally or illegally imported
phonorecords containing the sound recording could reduce its profits.
Harms would not receive any royalties from the illegally produced im-
ports, and both the legally and illegally produced imports would compete
with nonimports on the market.'' The royalty payment is not contin-
gent on where the phonorecords are distributed, but on where the com-
pulsory license is granted.102
Despite the prohibition against unauthorized importation of legally
River" to grant to Jem. They could only grant the permission to use their sound recordings. 2
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.04[B]. Second, the protection of the United States copyright code
does not extend beyond the borders of the United States unless the code so states. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa.
1983), aff'd without op., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
96. Damages in an infringement action may exceed royalties.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
98. See supra note 43 for an explanation of the Duchess doctrine, which is a judicial limita-
tion on the compulsory licensing provision. If the compulsory licensing provision was ade-
quately compensating the copyright owner or giving him control of his market, courts, such as
those in Duchess, Marks, Fame and Jondora, and copyright owners, such as Harms, would not
try to limit its application. See supra note 37 for the original purpose of the provision.
99. See supra notes 75 and 77.
100. Under section 115, a phonorecord must be made and distributed to the public for
royalties to become payable to the owner of the musical composition. 17 U.S.C. § I 15(c)(1)
(1986).
101. See supra notes 84 and 85.
102. The amount of the royalty may differ depending on the statutory royalty rate set by the
compulsory licensing provisions of each country. Therefore, if the statutory royalty rate in
New Zealand is less than that of the United States, although Harms is paid a royalty for the
phonorecords sold in New Zealand, the phonorecords Jem imported into the United States will
compete on the market with those phonorecords manufactured in the United States which
could earn Harms a higher royalty rate. Harms may be suing to insure that it makes the
highest profit it can from each market.
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manufactured phonorecords, the importation of such phonorecords may
generate additional royalties for musical composition copyright owners.
In the music industry today, most record sales of popular music are
based on the popularity of the performing artist. 0 3 Consider a pho-
norecord embodying a Frank Sinatra performance of "01' Man River"
and a phonorecord embodying a Bruce Springsteen performance of the
same musical composition. Sinatra fans will buy the Sinatra pho-
norecord and Springsteen fans will buy the Springsteen phonorecord.
Most fans want to hear their idol sing and are unconcerned with who
composed the song."° If the same Sinatra performance of "01' Man
River" could be found on two phonorecords, one which was manufac-
tured and distributed in the United States and the other in New Zealand,
and other songs on the phonorecords are not identical, a fan may
purchase both phonorecords to obtain more performances of different
songs. Even if some of the songs are duplicated on both phonorecords, a
fan may still purchase both phonorecords to obtain the performances
which are not duplicated.
In this situation, a musical composition copyright owner like Harms
would benefit from the availability of two versions of its composition on
the market.' If the prospective phonorecord buyer is not a Sinatra fan,
he will not purchase the Sinatra phonorecord which is legally manufac-
tured in the United States. The same buyer may purchase the Spring-
103. The name and photograph of the performer(s) appear on the cover of the phonorecord
and on any accompanying labels and packaging. The names of the composers usually appear
on a label on the phonorecord in a very small type size. At the Grammy Awards and other
recording industry award shows, the songwriting awards are not given during the telecast and
the recipients' names are reproduced in a small type size in the next day's newspaper. The
performers get television time, their names in the headlines and their pictures in the paper.
104. More often than not, the performer and the composer of a popular song are two differ-
ent people. During the big band era and through the 1950s, generally songs were provided to
singers by composers. The singer/songwriter was a development of the 1960s. If the song-
writer records his composition and releases it to the public, it becomes subject to compulsory
licensing. Sinatra does not write his songs, so it can be argued that people buy his records to
hear him sing. An argument may be made that Springsteen fans buy his phonorecords for the
dual benefit of hearing him sing and appreciating his songwriting.
An argument has been made that the singer/songwriter developed in response to the com-
pulsory licensing provision. Composers recognized that they were receiving minimal profits
and losing artistic control due to the use of their compositions under the compulsory licensing
provision. They began to record their own works to obtain performance, recording and com-
position royalties, and to control at least the first interpretation and mechanical reproduction
of their compositions. Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 691.
105. Although Harms receives more royalty payments when more versions of its composi-
tions are available, it also wants to insure that it receives the highest royalty rate from sales in
each market. Therefore, Harms wants to prevent legally manufactured foreign phonorecords,
which pay Harms low royalties, from competing on the market with domestic phonorecords,
which pay higher royalties. Harms prefers the sale of more phonorecords which pay higher
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steen phonorecord containing the same musical composition which was
imported into the United States with the sound recording copyright
owner's permission but without the musical composition copyright
owner's permission. As long as the Springsteen phonorecord was legally
manufactured under the copyright laws of a foreign country, the musical
composition copyright owner will receive a royalty for the use of the
composition. Harms receives two royalty payments for the same sound
recording of the same composition which is available on more than one
phonorecord. 0 6 If the purchasers of popular music were interested
solely in the musical composition, they would buy sheet music or the
collected works of Jerome Kern and Oscar Hammerstein II performed
by any artist.'l° Harms profits from the availability of various perform-
ances of its compositions.
Based on the above scenario, the unauthorized importation of pho-
norecords containing a copyrighted musical composition may increase
the copyright owner's profits. The right provided by section 60208 does
not truly serve the needs of musical composition copyright owners, be-
cause the musical composition, unlike the sound recording of the compo-
sition, is not a unique good in the market due to the compulsory licensing
provision.'0 9 Yet, owners of musical composition copyrights will enforce
the section 602' 'o right because it limits the compulsory licensing provi-
sion they dislike and gives them some control of the market. Since unau-
thorized importation has a greater negative impact on the profits of
owners of sound recording copyrights, or other goods not subject to com-
pulsory licensing, a solution may be restricting the application of the sec-
tion 602 right to goods not subject to compulsory licensing.1 1' Limiting
the availability of section 602'12 protection would create another incon-
sistency between the rights of owners of sound recordings and owners of
royalties, rather than the sale of more phonorecords which pay lower royalties. See supra note
102.
The Harms court did not discuss this royalty maximizing rationale. The rationale pro-
vides a justification for the court's holding that the right to control unauthorized importation
is not extinguished by compulsory licensing. The discussion in the text of this casenote reflects
the court's failure to utilize the royalty maximizing rationale.
106. Some fans will buy different performances by the same artist of the same song.
107. This is not to say that a person will not buy a song simply because they like the song.
However, most phonorecord buyers will not buy a song they like which is performed by an
artist they do not like.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
109. See supra note 105.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1986).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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musical compositions. 3 Rather than create another inconsistency in
how the law treats owners of copyrights in musical compositions and
sound recordings, the compulsory licensing provision which creates the
disparate treatment should be altered so that it treats all copyright own-
ers equally.
CONCLUSION
The compulsory licensing provision, as it was enacted in the 1909
Act and preserved in the 1976 Act, is no longer justified today. The fear
of a music monopoly is not eminent as it was in 1909. The compulsory
licensing provision is inconsistent with the copyright policy of owner
control and it discourages the composer's incentive to create by minimiz-
ing his profits from his work." 4 The provision fosters disparate treat-
ment of owners of musical composition copyrights and other copyright
owners. The disparate treatment of copyright owners leads to confusion
in the law. The confusion in the law and the musical composition copy-
right owner's lack of control of his market leads to excessive litigation.
The provision encourages copyright owners like Harms to bring suits
protecting whatever limited rights they have to gain some control over
the market.
Suppose an unknown singer/songwriter makes sound recordings of
his musical compositions which are embodied on a phonorecord. Few
copies of the phonorecord are sold, but the musical compositions become
available for compulsory licensing because they have been released to the
public." 5 Then, a famous performer makes a sound recording of one of
the musical compositions under the compulsory licensing provision and
has a big hit. The record industry argues that such a scenario demon-
strates the benefits of the compulsory licensing provision. The song-
writer receives royalties and exposure because of the hit by the famous
artist." 6 The famous artist obtains substantial profits from the perform-
113. See supra notes 102 and 105. Harms should be allowed to control the domestic market
and maximize its profits from each market it participates in.
114. The compulsory licensing provision may encourage composers to engage in more crea-
tive work because they will have to write more songs to make the same amount of money
under the statutory royalty rate as they could under negotiated royalty rates.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1986). Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 695.
116. The songwriter or copyright owner does benefit from a hit because he receives royalties
based on the number of copies made and distributed. See supra note 100. It may also be
argued that compulsory licensing benefits the unknown composer because the statutory royalty
rate insures that he receives payment of the standard royalty. It also insures the same royalty
for a famous, accomplished composer. Composers should be allowed to negotiate their royal-
ties based on their experience, popularity and the quality of their work.
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ance and recording royalties. 1 7 The public has access to popular music
and the record company makes a big profit.
Yet, only one of the original goals of compulsory licensing is served
in this scenario: the assurance of public access to popular music. That
goal is served by the dependence of the industry on public access to pop-
ular music, not by the terms of the compulsory licensing provision itself.
The composer still has no control over who mechanically reproduces his
work or over the quality of the performance. He or she is compensated
only by the statutory royalty, regardless of the musical composition's
quality or the composer's experience, popularity and accomplishments.
Copyright law generally gives the copyright owner more control over his
work than he is given under compulsory licensing. The free market also
rewards the producers of goods for the quality, popularity and reputation
of their goods. Compulsory licensing limits the musical composition
copyright owner's control of his work and prevents him from receiving
the rewards of the free market.
A composer is not encouraged to create under the circumstances
above, especially if a famous artist does not have a big hit with his com-
position. Compulsory licensing was preserved in the 1976 Act because it
is vital to the record industry as we know it today." 8 The provision does
not meet the goals it was initially enacted to serve and, in fact, the origi-
nal goals themselves have changed. Therefore, the provision should be
altered to solve the current problems composers and musical composi-
tion copyright owners face.
Because compulsory licensing is inconsistent with the rest of copy-
right law, the conflicting policies of owner control and public access cre-
ate tension whenever the provision is used. Courts try to make decisions
consistent with the owner control policy, which results in decisions in-
consistent with the policy of public access to popular music. The Harms
case is an excellent example of this tension. The section 602 right to
prevent unauthorized importation of legally or illegally produced goods
is consistent with the rest of copyright law. However, the application of
section 602 to musical compositions demonstrates the problems with the
compulsory licensing scheme.
By altering the current compulsory licensing provision so that popu-
lar songs would not be treated differently than other copyrighted goods,
inconsistencies in the law would be reduced." 9 Owners of musical com-
117. Bach, supra note 3, at 381; Rosenlund, supra note 3, at 692.
118. See supra note 71.
119. The Duchess doctrine is a result of the inconsistency of the compulsory licensing provi-
sion with the rest of copyright law. See supra note 43.
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position copyrights, like Harms, would not be forced to rely on importa-
tion rights that do not allow them to completely control the United
States' market.' 20 The provision should be altered so that it continues to
facilitate public access to popular music while ensuring that composers
will have access to a free market in which they can negotiate their royal-
ties based on the quality of their work and their reputation. Congress
should develop a noncompulsory licensing provision which encourages
public access and sincerely allows musical composition copyright owners
to control the mechanical reproduction of their compositions and the
royalty payments they receive.
Arpie Balekjian
120. See supra note 105 for an argument that the right to prevent unauthorized importation
gives the musical composition copyright owner some control of the United States' market in
terms of royalty maximization.
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